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Abstract: This article depicts the improvement in living conditions for those families of peasants (the 
“landless peasants”) who have benefited from agrarian reform (termed “assentamentos” i.e. 
homesteads) through the creation of farming cooperatives.  The farming cooperative examined herein 
was supported by the Petrobas group following the guidelines of the Brazilian National Biofuels 
Program.  This program seeks to foster biofuels production among peasant farmers in Brazil’s semi 
arid regions. The present research project comprises a field study which describes the aforesaid 
program’s evolution and, more critically, ascertains the conditions requisite for success. Several 
crucial conditions stand forth: 
1) First, convincing peasants to join the project; in this regard, a charismatic leader sharing the same 
social origins as the farming families has played a major role in gaining  their confidence. 
2) Second, developing a coherent set of value-adding activities that incorporate a range of by-products 
and waste products (from sunflower crops grown for biofuels, a number of corollary activities have 
arisen: honey, animal feed and fish farming). 
3) Finally Petrobas’s essential role as a partially state-owned corporation which has implemented a 
policy of social and environmental responsibility (assigning of a full-time engineer to oversee the 
project, providing farm equipment rentals needed for the crops as well as paying the salaries for two 
agronomic technicians working for the cooperative). 
 
Keywords: biofuel, family-based farming, cooperatives, social and environmental responsibility, social 
inclusion. 
 
Introduction 
The present study concerns Brazil’s National Biofuel Program as provided by the Act n° 
3368/03 ; the program seeks to promote Brazilian production of biofuel on family-owned 
homesteads situated in the semi-arid Nordeste region with the goal of facilitating social 
insertion for poor peasant farmers. This social legislation granted tax exemptions to 
industries producing biofuels should they purchase from peasant farmers.  Moreover, the 
legislation provided for subsidized loans within the framework of the PRONAF program 
(Program to support Family Farming).  
In the Brazilian states of Bahia, du Ceará, Rio Grande do Sul and Pernambuco, a number of 
biofuel production projects—all involving groups of peasant producers—have been the object 
of research. This paper concerns one of the aforementioned sites situated in Rio Grande do 
Norte. The community development program benefits from social aid offered by Petrobras, 
the major Brazilian Petroleum Group.  The company’s social and environmental policy is 
clearly manifested through its participation in the community project.  The present study 
draws upon the Triple Bottom Line concept of « economy/society/ecology » (Elkington, 
1998).  Within this theory, business corporations, besides merely creating shareholder value, 
must undertake a policy for sustainable development while striving to satisfy the broader 
 
 
stakeholders’ needs (Lepineux, 2005) linking economic activities to broader social and 
environmental actions (Savitz, 2007). 
Herein we shall strive to identify both the key factors for the successful social inclusion of 
rural peasant farmers within a community project by means biofuel production as well as the 
major obstacles that could impede its implementation. 
Our method is by nature inductive. The research takes its lead from real-life experiences and 
not from secondary sources.  Theory steps in to frame and structure the fieldwork as well as 
to interpret and explicate empirical observations.  
The present study shall provide a series of propositions conducive to the creation of 
agriculture cooperatives in the biofuel sector given the specific economic, cultural and 
political context of Brazil’s Nordeste while simultaneously assuring a conscientious 
management for those small-scale farming communities. 
Geography of the field work 
The townships of João Câmara and Ceará-Mirim are located approximately 120 kilometers 
from the city of Natal in the Rio Grande do Norte’s « agreste » zone, that is, a region 
sandwiched between the rainy coast and the semi-arid Sertão.  In the Mato Grande region, 
some 500 families of small-scale farmers are scattered over 15 townships.  Since 1994, 
these families have settled in the region within the framework of agrarian reform. Our present 
study concerns the village named “Model 1” which shelters 70 families. 
Isaías Marcos, in 2006 vice president of the ARCO Association, provided us with information 
on the two rural communities in João Câmara.  The families obtained permits to settle the 
land without receiving immediate ownership.  Title deeds are granted several years later so 
as to guarantee full-fledged engagement in the community project and to hinder opportunistic 
behavior in which beneficiaries might resell their land rights and continue to militate for 
further land rights elsewhere—a behavior viewed with extreme disfavor by the general public. 
In the main, Brazilian social strife has its storm center over demands for a “right to land”.  
Impoverished families belonging to the Movement of the Landless, the MST, are often seen 
living in precarious settlements squeezed between the barbed wire fences surrounding a 
large plantation and the neighboring stretch of road. 
Homes have electricity and most have televisions with parabolic antennas.  However, almost 
no families have vehicles and the few present are jalopies. At the community’s inception, 
farming entirely depended upon draft animals; today, several tractors are in use.  
Each family possesses 22 hectares of farmland, but given their limited means, the families 
only cultivate one or two hectares of beans, maize or sorghum, the rest lies fallow.  
According to Isaías Marcos, living conditions have considerably improved under Lula’s 
presidency.  The majority of families receive welfare benefits.  Scarcely a handful of families 
do not receive welfare benefits and even the latter obtain donations in the form of such 
necessities as bottled gas.  All the children attend school, a school bus provides the shuttle 
service.  Mornings are reserved for home chores and extra curricular activities, classes take 
place in the afternoon and evenings.  Two meals and two snacks are provided daily.  
Purposes of the present research 
The present paper seeks to determine what conditions underlie the success of the holistic 
project for rural development as described above. This federal program favors the 
manufacture of diesel fuel obtained by means of extraction from oilseed crops raised on 
small-scale family farms in semi-arid areas of the Nordeste. 
To grasp the project’s success, several interconnected domains must be taken into account.   
First, the conditions giving rise to agricultural cooperatives based on participative decision 
making by all members (Buarque, 2002).  Second, the cultural dimension which explains the 
reluctance to change and the difficulties encountered when trying to mobilize hitherto 
excluded peasants into a community-based project so as to create a cooperative (Cançado 
et al., 2007). Third, the concept of a circular economy whose goal is to implement, within a 
holistic project, the production of co-products and by-products in order to maximize value 
 
 
creation for the benefit of the small farmers (Sachs, 2007).  In addition, the role of networks, 
the weight of political agents and the commitment of businesses and major industrial firms 
must all be taken into consideration when examining the success of such a project to favor 
peasant farmers (Rosé, 2003). A final aspect concerns firms’ social and environmental 
duties; herein we have an instance of such a policy implemented by the partially-nationalized 
Petrobras group (d’Hurmières, 2005).  
 
Project Background 
Francisco Evangelista, engineer and researcher in renewable energy at Pertrobras has been 
tasked with developing a sunflower-based biodiesel production program in collaboration with 
the local farmers. 
As an introduction, let us recount several of Evangelista’s observations expressed during the 
first interview he granted the authors.  His commentary will allow us to better situate the 
project in the overall context. 
The National Biodiesel Project is quite recent : the legislation instituting the project dates 
from 2004 and Petrobras, whose participation was required by the Federal Government, had 
no experience in either agriculture or biodiesel production. 
From a strictly agricultural point of view, Petrobras underwent its trial experience in biofuels 
at the João Câmara site. In order to initiate the project, various formalities had to be 
completed : partnership contracts had to be concluded between the small farmers’ 
association (created specifically for the occasion), the local township, and the state of Rio 
Grande do Norte. As the administrative formalities proved lengthier than foreseen, the 
sunflower was only sown at the end of the rainy season and some 150 hectares of harvest 
were lost.  In 2007, 600 hectares of sunflower were sown, yet as a result of low rainfall, the 
harvest again proved disappointing.  During the 2007 season, the crops received a scant 82 
mm of rainfall. 
 
In the state of of Rio Grande do Norte, an initial experiment of biodiesel production from 
castor beans failed as there was yet no industrial production chain in operation. At harvest 
time, Petrobras declared it would be unable to purchase the crop due to a lack of an 
operational processing plant; after lengthy discussions to ascertain whom to blame for the 
setbacks, the processor Brasil Ecodiesel bought the crop at a much lower price than one real 
as had initially been foreseen. 
This brief overview illustrates the necessity of laying out coherent and coordinated policies 
when implementing local projects as well as organizing the processing/value chains.  In 
various cases, processing plants for oil extraction have been built without crop inputs; in 
other instances, crops have been sown without the industrial purchasers adhering to their 
earlier promises to buy. 
From these unfavorable outcomes , Francisco Evangelista draws the following conclusions : 
first, farmers need to cooperate since it is impractical for an industrial processor to make the 
rounds collecting single sacks of castor beans from hundreds of small farms and, 
furthermore, in such a project with varied participants, a coordinator is needed for overall 
guidance. As we shall show in what follows, with the previous setbacks borne in mind, 
Petrobras urged the farmers at João Câmara to create their own sales  association—known 
as the ARCO—and to oversee the whole project, acting as the general contractor, as it were, 
financing both the cultivation and ensuring harvesting.The day-to-day oversight fell onto 
Francisco Evangelista’ shoulders. 
The idea of a value network wherein each member labors harmoniously with the others 
scarcely coincides with our observations.  Personal rivalries, political differences, conflicts of 
interest conspire (especially when hurdles loom) to bring about mutual accusations and 
finger pointing at the other institutions which are held to blame.  Our interviewees often 
insisted on the Brazilian government’s tendency to present tidy projects on paper which raise 
great hopes but which rapidly exasperate given the participants’ lack of competence, 
cooperation and ethical standards. 
 
General remarks on the present project’s context 
 
 
Competitivity 
Regardless its production site, biodiesel cannot compete against petroleum diesel; hence 
political support must be forthcoming to set national policy, chaperon installation construction 
and grant subsidies. In Evangelista’s eyes, the beneficiaries of such exonerations, the 
purchasers, disrespect the requirements stipulating that 50% of the raw materials must 
derive from family-owned farmers in the arid Nordeste.  In reality, the castor bean crop in the 
Nordeste is much less than the quantities declared by the processors so as to ensure their 
receiving aid.  In 2008,the shortfall in castor beans was compensated through the addition of 
soya oil and given the nation-wide problems surrounding peasant farmer upgrading to 
soybean production, over 90% of biodiesel was obtained from soybeans. 
 
The competitive dilemma surrounding capital-intensive soybean plantations 
The key issue underlying production of biodiesel fuel from soybeans arises from the fact that 
this crop is grown on large, highly-mechanized plantations and thus does not favor job 
creation.  Given its cultivation requirements, soybean farming remains beyond the means of 
small farmers.  Moreover, soybean production enhances the risk of transferal from feed uses 
to energy uses which could lead to a rise in soybean oil prices, a staple for both humans and 
animals. Therein lays a motive for seeking non comestible crops to fulfill this role.  From this 
point of view, the cooperatives’ farmers have been experimenting with other non edible 
oilseed crops grown in the semi arid region, namely the pinhão manso or ‘jatropha’. 
 
The Issue of Small Farmers’ incomes 
Small-scale family farmers occupy the earlier stages of the value chain. For a major firm 
such as Petrobras, before bringing social and ecological solutions to bear, a division of 
profits had to been shared between the various agents involved in the project. 
Obviously, the oilseed farmers seek profits from the crops. A fair price must be ensured for 
their crops, otherwise they will not raise such plants since much less risk surrounds edible 
crops grown for personal consumption or sale on local markets. Petrobras’s engagement 
with the aforesaid families narrows down to furnishing aid towards cultivating sunflowers and 
collecting the seeds for processing into biodiesel.  Henceforth, we shall focus on the holistic 
project comprising merely 16 families who are involved in the farmers’ cooperative, the 
COPEC. 
 
The question of climatic risks 
Crop yields in the non irrigated, semi-arid region of the Nordeste are highly irregular as a 
result of climatic vagaries: the region receives little rainfall and yields vary from year to year.   
In early June 2007, during a paper presented at the seminar on Energy Diversification held at 
Natal, Ulysses da Costa equally a Petrobras engineer, displayed the variations in production 
levels of grain between the years 2004 and 2005 for Rio Grande do Norte, as shown below 
in Table I.  
Table 1. Variation in Grain Production in the Rio Grande do Norte between 2004 and 2005. 
Year Production Arable land 
2004 160 000 metric tons 486 000 hectarres 
2005 78 000 metric tons 410 000 hectares 
Source: Costa Soares, Petrobras, Natal 
 
Biodiesel producers must take into account these enormous supply variations due to weather 
patterns.  Given these imponderables, should provision be made for large storage facilities? 
Continuous production of biodiesel would require such storage to ensure operations outside 
of harvest time. 
More crucially, with an unregulated market, these supply vicissitudes in grains or oilseeds 
impact on prices: given the threat of price oscillations, what mechanisms might guarantee a 
minimum income for the family farmers? 
 
Uncertain incomes and dependency on support agencies 
 
 
 
Those farmers we have met are nearly destitute; with no financial wherewithal, they cannot 
undertake oilseed cultivation for biofuels.  As an example, to plow and sow at planting 
season, they need both a tractor and a sowing machine.  Should the municipality fail to 
provide the promised equipment opportunely, either no planting would occur or the crop 
would germinate late and lose the advantage of the first spring rains. In 2006, such an 
untoward situation did occur in João Câmara. 
This dependency necessitates strict organization and a political pressure that can be exerted 
on the authorities given that during the sowing season, tractors and agricultural equipment 
are in strong demand.  An agricultural cooperative enables the purchase of various tractors 
and equipment which may be shared and thus reduce climatic risks and strengthen their 
weight in negotiation. 
Bedeviled with the small farmers’ precariousness and the lack of serious coordination among 
the various political authorities, Petrobras chose to directly manage the project we describe 
herein; the company urged the farmers to form an organization and for certain members 
within it to unite in a cooperative.   
Petrobras’s crucial role 
 
Since 2004, Petrobras has collaborated with these two rural communities to ensure 
sunflower crops for biodiesel production.  The arguments in favor of sunflower crops rather 
than castor beans adduce several factors: foremost, castor beans contain ricin, a highly toxic 
protein which precludes the bean’s use in animal feed; secondly, castor-bean oil is 
exceedingly viscous and cannot be directly used as engine fuel; finally, F. Evangelista has 
drawn attention to a further problem, the castor bean’s ricin corrodes the German processing 
equipment which Petrobras purchased for its pilot plant.  Accordingly, in early 2007, on a 
collective plantation, Petrobras decided to sow 600 hectares with sunflower;  each member 
family receives a share of the global income.  Petrobras rents the necessary equipment and 
brings to bears technical aid as well as financing the plowing and planting.  The seed stock 
were provided by the state government of Rio Grande do Norte. 
The farmers tasks included tending the crops, fertilizing the fields and harvesting.  Mr. 
Evangelista observes that the harvest’s value mostly covers operating costs and agricultural 
labor—however, when ascertaining the farmer’s earnings, the value of co products must be 
factored into the equation.  For instance, sunflower leaves provide excellent animal feed, and 
sunflowers also serve as a source of honey.  Beehives are being installed to enhance 
community revenues.  In 2007, despite a proper planting calendar, the yield was mediocre: 
only 750kg per hectare.  This low yield was a result of below average winter rainfall (between 
March and August only 82 mm instead of the average 800mm of rainfall).  
For the aforementioned season, the families received R$ .50 per kilo—a price set in 
collaboration with the association ARCO (Commercial Association of Mato Grande and 
Grande Natal) and Petrobras, as related by ARCO’s vice president, Isaías Marcos.  It was at 
Petrobras’s behest that the ARCO was founded; Marcos states its purpose as linking 
communities and implementing alternative methods favorable to family agriculture. 
In 2007, the decision was taken to create a true farmers’ cooperative that would implement a 
collective project involving 16 member families.  The project sought to raise cattle with 
sunflower leave-based feed, produce honey using sunflowers, extract biodiesel from the 
seeds and create fish farms. The overall aim reposes on the concept of a circular economy, 
expounded as follows by Louis Chaussade, chief executive officer for Suez Environment : 
“we have to create an economy capable of adding value to those items which are 
undervalued in order to reemploy systematically  and intelligently all materials” (Barré and 
Chauveau, 2008). 
On the scale of the cooperative, does the conscientious use of co-products and by products 
resulting from oilseed cultivation conform to the foregoing vision?  The SEBRAE, a public 
organization which aids small businesses, contributed to detailing a policy for enhancing the 
value of the secondary products.  Moreover, the cooperative concluded a commercial 
agreement with the state which in turn agreed to purchase part of the harvest for supplying 
various public institutions as schools and hospitals.  
 
 
To organize the peasant farmers, Mr Evangelista observes, much time is needed.  To rally 
the farmers requires an appealing program.  Merely guaranteeing a minimum revenue does 
not suffice, acceptable living conditions as well as health and educational aid both come into 
play when seeking to garner peasant support. 
On June 20th 2008, representatives from the State Agricultural Development Ministry, the 
National Institute for Colonization and Agricultural Reform (INCRA), Petrobras, the Bank of 
Brazil (Banco do Brasil), the Bank of the Northeast (Banco do Nordeste) and the government 
of Rio Grande do Norte visited the land distribution sites for the Mato Grosso region.  During 
this meeting, officials announced the construction of a sunflower grain mill—a project which 
would be conjointly undertaken by Petrobras and the COPEC cooperative.  
 
Summary of an interview with the President of the COPEC 
 
Background description of the COPEC’s president 
Native to the state of Santa Catarina (region in Southern Brazil), Livânia Frizon has long 
been an activist in the Movement for the Landless (MST).  Today, separated from the 
movement, she has settled  with her family at Canudos within the framework of a federal land 
distribution program.  While president of the ARCO association, in early 2008, she equally 
became president of the Canudos Producers’ Cooperative (COPEC). The latter came into 
being at the behest of Petrobras, the cooperative status constituting a necessary legal 
condition so that Petrobras, as a mixed enterprise in which the Brazilian federal government 
holds a minority interest, might enter into a contractual arrangement to finance the local 
development project. 
With her strong personality, Livânia Frizon had three fundamental qualities for presiding over 
the COPEC : that of her Italian immigrant family background with a long history of 
cooperation with other families.  This associative culture, common to Southern and 
Southeastern Brazil,  does not have an equivalent in the Nordeste for the latter region has 
been historically dominated by large landlords, organized within the system of “coronels” 
From the beginning of the Portuguese colonial period, aristocratic families received 
allotments of enormous expanses of land—the “hereditary captaineries”— from the 
monarchy.  In this archaic system, some of whose elements have prevailed until the present, 
the richly endowed landlords control vast territories and have oppressed the small farmers 
who live in poverty. Despite repeated uprisings over the centuries, the penurious farmers 
have never managed to organize themselves. 
As a second advantage, President Frizon has taken part in the Landless Peasants 
movement and thus has met many from the socially excluded classes.  From these 
experiences, she has come understand their worldview and she is fully aware of the 
difficulties encountered when seeking to further social inclusion of the penurious families 
through communitarian programs. 
A final and non negligible  advantage for Livânia Frizon is her profession : she works for the 
Rio Grande do Norte’s Agricultural and Fishing Administration; hence, Ms Frizon is directly 
involved the state’s agricultural development policy and has the means to mobilize local 
actors in projects at Ceará-Mirim and at João Câmara. 
 
The Holistic COPEC project 
As previously mentioned, the COPEC cooperative comprises merely 16 families.  A cluster of 
complementary activities have been implemented within the association to better the living 
conditions of the member families. Ms Frizon hopes that success in this case will serve as an 
example for other families on the site, those little inclined to change their behavior.  All 
families engaged in the project spontaneously offered to take part in it and strongly motivated 
families were accepted through an on-going basis. 
Ms Frizon marvels at the crafts skills of the small landowners in southern Brazil.  Whether 
involved in producing foodstuffs, textile goods, leather goods, or wooden goods, these 
cottage-industry activities enable the peasants to earn extra income.  As a challenge, 
President Frizon sought to instill a similar industrious spirit in the Canudo peasants while 
 
 
heightening their awareness of the necessity for collective work required by the aforesaid 
cottage industries. 
A 20 hectare homestead will not in itself lift a family from poverty.  If these families, in 
Livânia’s eyes, through lack of resources, merely work the soil with hoes (enxada), both the 
land under cultivation and the crop yield would not meet their most basic subsistence needs.   
A farm with a sufficiently large surface area requires a minimum amount of equipment that an 
impoverished family could not afford. 
As a 600-hectare sunflower plantation requires tractors, the cooperative purchased a seeder 
and an oil press.  As a result, rather than selling sunflower seeds, the COPEC sells unrefined 
oil to Petrobras, thus upgrading their position on the value chain and adding greater value on 
the cooperative itself as well as retaining the pressed residue for use a animal feed and 
fertilizer.  Sunflower cultivation give rise to honey production as a natural co-product : 
beekeepers   taught  their craft to members of the cooperative and beehives were placed 
near the fields. 
With assistance from the EMBRAPA, the Brazilian Institute for Agronomic Research, another 
highly profitable culture—papayas or “mamão”—was introduced on a seven hectare farm.  A 
strong demand exists for this fruit, both on local markets and for export.  A papaya plantation, 
properly fertilized and tended, provides a high yield and a favorable income for the farmers. 
 
Fishfarming within the framework of the holistic project. 
Given the overall policy goal of maximum diversification in revenue sources and value 
enhancement through by-product use, one project particularly stands out : fish farming.  
Although rainfall is sporadic and low, there is abundant groundwater in the aquifer and this 
fact gave birth to  the plan to raise Tilapia fish  for which a strong demand exists.  Financing 
originated from the Banco do Brasil and the EMATER of Rio Grande do Norte. Within 2 years 
favorable development ensued.  The project’s novelty lies in its collective organization : 6 
ponds are used and one family is responsible for each.  Hence, with 6 families a continuous 
annual production is possible.  As the fish mature in 6 months, each of the families provides 
the workforce for one month.  The families have shown a strong common spirit, fish farming 
requires daily work, should one family need leisure time, another family will pitch in and 
provide the temporary help.  As further proof of the  project’s global connectedness, not only 
are sunflower products used to feed the fish, but 10% of the water from the ponds is used to 
fertilize and irrigate family gardens where, besides the traditional manioc crop, lettuce, 
tomatoes and onions are also grown.  Finally, within the framework of value adding activities, 
a crafts program has taken root where leather goods are made from tilapia skin whose 
leather is as durable as that of crocodiles. 
Since its inception, the fish farm has produced 17 metric tons of fish, and the seven year loan 
granted by the Bank of Brazil was reimbursed within less than two  years!  The fish farm has 
grown so that there are now 18 ponds varying in size from 25 to 75 square meters using 
some 1.3 million liters of water. 
On average, according to Ms Frizon, each family earns 1,700 reals per month from the fish 
farm (somewhat less than 700 euros), three times Brazil’s minimum wage.  Today’s monthly 
production exceeds 5,000 kilos of tilapia.  The Bank of Brazil uses this program’s success in 
their public relations material as an example of it social engagement policy favoring small 
farmers.  To reward the cooperative for their initiative, the bank gave the COPEC a pick-up 
truck; through media coverage, the cooperative has gained a solid reputation.  Through the 
snow-ball effect, Ms Frizon enjoys an enhanced ability to implicate local actors in the 
community-based projects. 
In June 2008, the vice governor of Rio Grande do Norte and secretary for environment and 
water resources, Iberê Ferreira de Souza visited the fish farm.  Mr de Souza declared “The 
government has every reason to take great interest in these projects, particularly those 
involving the landless homesteads.  Given the serious work performed at Aracati, we intend 
to show our commitment through an agreement by which Petrobas  contractually agrees  to 
purchase not only all the oil  extracted from oilseeds and not merely that from sunflowers but 
from cottonseed as well in other regions in the state.” (Gazeta, 2008). 
On the same occasion, Ms Frizon asserted : “As a result of our development, we are earning 
the respect from both public and private organizations with whom we can strengthen our ties.  
 
 
The government and Petrobas have promised to purchase our sunflower crop, and no 
financial  problems should arise since the Bank of Brazil has 30 branch offices offering loans 
specifically for biodiesel projects.” 
 
Cultural Aspects  
In Ms Frizon’s eyes, the cultural aspect is a crucial for developing the project, and for this 
reason during our open interview, she spoke a great deal on this point. First, she raised the 
issue of the poor’s lack of long-term vision.  Even when belonging to an organized group, 
once the families receive a homestead, they rarely manage to produce beyond their 
immediate needs.  Given their concerns for survival, they insist on short term results  rather 
long-term planning. 
Some 95% of the family farmers in the region, affirms Ms Frizon, cannot obtain loans : often 
the funds lent for farming were used to purchase consumer goods like televisions or 
motorcycles.  This form of embezzlement seems to be routinely condoned by movement 
leaders.  Given the standard indictments that politicians are corrupt, should it be surprising to 
see the poor renege on their debts?   
Moreover, the overall background of local corruption and kickbacks to authorities, practices 
deeply rooted in the Nordeste, all lend themselves to a cultural acceptance of swindling. 
With little long term perspective and a fatalism as regards their living conditions, the small 
are imbued with what Ms Frizon terms “the culture of misery”; to her mind, “they are 
convinced that the only way to survive is to take from others  and to take from nature”.  At the 
project’s outset, some farmers had asked whether Petrobas would financed tree cutting; 
other farmers sold the fertilizer provided by the cooperative; even others, incapable of 
tending their crops on a daily basis only took part in the work at planting and harvesting 
times. A further risk is that the peasants having received homesteads sell them and thus 
remain in poverty. For the latter reason, the sites herein studied all have collective property 
rights with a long waiting period before any peasants may sell their land. 
The major challenge, in Ms Frizon’s mind, is to reeducate a people who feel that a better life 
is unattainable and that they find acceptance of  any project as beyond their capacity.  She 
forcefully affirmed that “to get them out of poverty, their mindsets have to change, they have 
march in a direction opposite to the path to destitution.” To do such, the director of a 
cooperative must not make a show of compassion but must exercise strong authority, 
impose discipline, convey her ideas and occasionally punish. If families receive financial 
help, they must fulfill the corresponding obligations. For instance, if a group of 18 families is 
responsible for a plantation, and each family must take part in the farming once every 18 
days, if one member fails, the entire collective suffers and a fine must be paid by the 
negligent family.  As a further example of aberrant behavior, Ms Frizon drew our attention to 
a case where members of the community took part in drug dealing between the “favelas” in 
Natal.  She managed to film certain operations, informed the local police which led to the 
arrest of 11 culprits.  Ms Frizon equally intervened when she learnt of an embezzlement by 
an ex-president of the ARCO association.  Instead of dealing with the problem behind closed 
doors, as is done customarily, she convened a special general meeting where the facts were 
publicly divulged in presence of the accused. Since then, the individual in question has 
resigned and cultivates his land without contact with the other members of the association. 
Ms Frizon’s intends to show that the game plan and its rules have changed. Be what it may, 
in the Nordeste, an attempt such as hers is not without risks.  Personal animosity and 
conflicts of interest can easily lead to violence in a region where assassinations are still 
commonplace. Ms Frizon expressed her lack of fear of threats or reprisals. In the given 
circumstances, “Above all no sign of weakness must be exhibited”. She did admit that her 
chauffeur is not always at ease when they travel throughout the area. 
The major wager lies on modifying the peasant culture by providing examples of successful 
projects.  On the one hand, these projects prove to the individualistic peasants that collective 
actions can yield rapid results. The reluctant farmers can observe the clear improvement in 
living conditions of those families engaged in the collective projects. On the other hand, the 
participants in the collective actions have taken credit for their success and have persevered 
in their efforts to increase productivity and to diversify the range of activities. Today, the 
participants no longer receive state-paid benefits and the farmers are proud to have left the 
 
 
welfare ranks, particularly those who survive only through federal government aid, the so-
called “family stipend”. 
This family stipend (Expension, 2009) is a welfare benefit program for the poorest families 
with dependent children, from the newly born to those aged 16.  On average benefits amount 
to 61 reals a month (about 24 euros).  To receive such, families must agree to allow their 
children to attend school as well as to vaccinate their children.  In 2008, 11 million Brazilian 
families, some 40 individuals out of a population of 180 million, benefited from this system,  
The family subsidy, affirms President Frizon, forms an essential means of improving the lives 
of the poorest; but she also believes it must be considered as a transitional measure to lift 
the poorest from the wretched condition. As one can image, the benefits could lead the 
recipients the to consider the subsidy as a perpetual crutch, leading to a permanent relation 
of dependency on state aid, detrimental to social inclusion and finding a means of earning a 
better living through one’s own work. That higher standard of living does not merely result 
from farm labor, it also is the fruit of education, to this end, another project is being 
implemented, one that provides technical and agricultural training programs for the denizens 
of these communities. 
As to our question concerning the role of Petrobras in the development program, Ms Frizon 
affirmed that the company’s role was crucial to success.  Without the unwavering assistance 
from Pretrobras, the project would not have been realized.  Moreover, Petrobras enabled the 
project to find outside aid and not rely on local sources thus avoiding many inconveniences.  
While the first harvests, partially due to the weather, did not offer adequate yields, nor 
provide much earnings to either Petrobras or to the farmers, they enabled the farmers to 
develop an active sense of community. As Francisco Evangelista, the Petrobras engineer 
who oversees the program, said in a second interview granted in 2008, if the cooperatives’ 
participants earn an income from fish farming and crops other than sunflower used for the 
biodeisel, this is not really a problem since the overriding goal is to improve the farmers’ 
lives. 
In February 2008, Petrobras and the government of the state of Rio Grande do Norte 
implemented the state program for Agri-ecology and Family Agriculture.  This project plans to 
seed 13,000 hectares of sunflower for biodiesel production, along with 15,000 hectares of 
cotton.   A minimum price will be fixed for the crops and some 12,000 family farmers in 32 
different municipalities; the majority of the beneficiaries live in the following regions: 
Cidadania Açu-Mossoró, the Sertão de Apodi and  Mato Grande. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This field study has enabled us to verify Petrobras’s sincere intention to undertake 
development projects within the framework of the Brazilian National Biodiesel Project while 
satisfying the federal government’s desire to improve the living conditions for family farmers 
in semi-arid regions. 
During an interview conducted at Petrobras’s headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, Jefferson 
Souza, the Petrobras consultant for social responsibility, outlined the following policy 
orientation.  Among the options for biodiesel production, Petrobras has an overall interest in 
producing family agriculture-based biofuel production rather than capital intensive large-
plantation soy production.  This latter type of production lies totally outside the purview of 
Petrobras : soybean agriculture relies on the multinational purveyors of seeds (Montsanto for 
gene-modified seedstock) and fertilizers on the upstream end of the value chain, and 
international distributors ( like Cargill or  Bunge) on the downstream end of the value chain.   
The strategic interest shown by Petrobras in the Ceará-Mirim and João Câmara sites within 
the framework of the firm’s social and environmental policy gives cause for optimism.  The 
company, 32% state-owned, with sales of 96 billion dollars and 74,000 employers, has both 
the means and the capacities for achieving its goals. 
In addition, Petrobras, with its public financing, has long been tasked with ensuring Brazil’s 
energy independence (Drouvot, 2005). Mr Evangelista confirmed the company’s long-term 
 
 
intention to implement a viable biodiesel production network which will promote the interests 
of family-based grower in the Nordeste’s semi-arid regions.   
Yaziji (2004) has insisted upon the importance of strategic alliances between industry and 
social development organizations.  Firms gain a more favorable image by their social 
commitments and thereby obtain a competitive advantage. A firm’s ability to foresee novel 
social requirements arising from the concept of sustainable development can be seen as an 
integral part of the firm’s innovative capacity and as well as the ability to acquire new skills 
which ultimately contribute to fixing new social standards for production.  Environmentally 
friendly, socially-oriented projects as those we have just described not only give birth to 
synergies between the main actors (a rural community and Petrobras) which redound to their 
mutual interest, but also induce a much broader range of benefits accruing to local society.  
All the players involved in this project (support agencies, politicians, simple citizens) are 
imbued with a new business vision and develop a renewed collective conscience concerned 
with social and ecological issues. 
This field study has highlighted the varied cultural aspects of a project requiring the active 
engagement of farmers and the need for a strong leader who could mobilize the farmers.  
The president Frizon, leader of the COPEC, undoubtedly fills the role needed to ensure a 
holistic, community-based, value creating development project. 
The economic results obtained by the cooperative, clearly demonstrate that this mode of 
collective action can serve as a true means to reinsert a group of family farmers in the social 
economy.  The range of activities performed within the cooperative not only confer greater 
earning, but more crucially greater autonomy and sense of enterprise, all more so given that 
the limited number of members in the COPEC allow direct participation in the decision 
making.  
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